Why I’m Glad Christopher Dorner Isn’t My Problem Anymore (And Why Your Job is Harder)

Posted on 2026-05-14

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I’d like to start with a statement that might sound a little callous: I'm glad the Christopher Dorner manhunt is over. Not because I wanted him caught or dead. I mean that I'm relieved I don't have to manage that type of emergency logistics anymore. The pressure was unlike anything I'd seen before, and it taught me lessons about preparedness, rapid response, and the sheer cost of being caught off guard that I still use today.

The 2013 manhunt for Dorner in the San Bernardino mountains was a nightmare for local law enforcement, but for a specific kind of logistics specialist—people like me who handle crisis supply chains—it was a masterclass in what not to do. I'm an emergency logistics coordinator. I spent the first part of my career working with police departments and emergency management agencies, and a full year after that event, I was still getting my head around the failures. If you've ever had a delivery arrive damaged, you know that sinking feeling. Multiply that by a thousand, and you're close to the feeling of a three-day operation with no supply resupply.

The Core Argument: Preparation is a Cost, Not an Option

So here’s my blunt opinion: if you rely on a standard 9-to-5 supply chain for your crisis response, you’re not prepared. You’re gambling. Most people think crisis logistics is about moving as fast as possible. It isn't. It’s about having the right things in the right place *before* you know where ‘right’ is. That's the difference between a successful operation and a complete disaster. In my opinion, the extra cost for pre-built emergency kits and a dedicated rapid logistics partner is always justified.

Lesson 1: The 48-Hour Bottleneck

During the Dorner search, between February 3rd and February 6th, a massive team of officers was deployed, but the supply chain for food, water, ammunition, and batteries collapsed after 48 hours. I saw the reports. Teams were running on adrenaline and gas station snacks. The planning assumption was that the operation would be over quickly. It wasn't.

From my perspective, the biggest failure was a lack of 'days of supply' thinking. The standard planning uses a 'resupply every 24 hours' model. That’s fine for a parade. It’s a death sentence for a manhunt. The standard calculation for this is: Number of personnel × 1.5 × estimated hours × cost per unit. For a force of 100 people needing MREs (around $8 each) for three days, that's about $3,600. That's the cost of being smart. The cost of failure was 1,000 officers not eating, which is a $0 cost on a spreadsheet but infinite cost to morale and performance. I'd rather spend 10 minutes explaining the cost of a 72-hour supply than deal with a tired, hungry team making mistakes.

Lesson 2: The 'Just-in-Time' Trap

I get why people try to save money on emergency supplies—budgets are real. But the hidden costs add up. In the Dorner case, the departments involved tried to use their standard supply vendors on a 'just-in-time' basis. The problem is, just-in-time works for predictable demand. It fails when demand is a sudden, massive spike.

Let me rephrase that: the vendor systems are 'flexible.' What I mean is they'll negotiate if you push. But when you need 4,000 AA batteries, 200 gallons of water, and 500 rain ponchos by 6 AM tomorrow? The standard vendor can't do that. They have other customers. You're paying boom-times for normal infrastructure. Our company lost a contract for a disaster response in 2018 because we tried to save $600 on a pre-built 'sheriff's office response kit' of water, MREs, and first aid supplies. Instead, we convinced them to use standard vendors. When a wildfire hit, the vendors were out of stock. The consequence? The department had to buy at a 40% markup from a sports store. That was $8,000 wasted.

Addressing the Inevitable Criticism

I know what some of you are thinking. 'But what if the crisis never comes? That's a waste of money.' To be fair, I get that. The budget for a small police department is tight. But here’s the thing: if you never have a crisis, you’ve bought peace of mind. If you *do* have one, and you fail, the cost in public trust and human life is incalculable. The difference between having a 72-hour cache and not having one is a single purchase order. The risk of not having it is a failed operation.

Final Word: The 'And' Factor

An informed customer asks better questions and makes faster decisions. The search for Christopher Dorner wasn't a failure because of bad cops—it was a failure of logistics planning. The assumption was that a 'fast' response meant a 'good' response. It didn't. A fast response is only good if you have a deep supply chain behind it. So, here's my final opinion: You cannot have a fast response without a prepared supply chain. It's not about if you can get something in 24 hours. It's about what you have for the first 24 hours. That’s the part most people get wrong. Trust me on this one.